Public institutions such as governmental facilities, hospitals, universities, and amusement parks may be targeted by terrorists using weapons of mass destruction due to their potential to cause large numbers of casualties.
Preparedness of a Public Institution
ation of a well-informed and trained population. When a medical team or dispensary is part of the facility, it must be integrated fully into the response plan. The medical team may be the first to detect any unusual signs and symptoms in people affected by a biological, chemical, or radiological agent. This information must be shared immediately with the head of security in the facility and reported to the police, EMS, and regional hospitals. Immediate action must be taken to contain the source of the attack (in a chemical or radiological incident), the "hot zone" should be cordoned off and rescue operation commenced. The medical team in the facility should supervise the evacuation of the casualties to a collection point in a clean area, where triage and first aid can be provided.The medical team should be reinforced by EMS teams that may assume the command and control of medical activities in the facility.
In Israel, the Magen David Adom organization (The Red Shield of David) is the national emergency medical service, operating approximately 700 ambulances through 12 regional dispatch centers covering the whole country. About 10% of the ambulances are mobile intensive care units, staffed with paramedics, and equipped with automatic ventilators, antidotes, drugs, and medical equipment to treat most emergencies on-site. All the other ambulances have the basic medical equipment to provide basic life support and are staffed with two emergency medical technicians and a volunteer. Each ambulance also carries Level C protective equipment (PPE) and respirators, providing protection to its personnel against toxic chemical substances. As EMS personnel will not be required to operate in the suits for >20 minutes, this protection is deemed adequate.The police and fire personnel entering the highly contaminated area (hot zone) wearing Level A suits are responsible for evacuating the victims. Due to the heat load, they only will be able to stay in their PPE and respirators for several minutes. After undergoing medical triage, all victims of any chemical incident will be undressed in a clean area and receive first aid and ventilatory support, if needed, before their evacuation to the nearest medical center.
The staff of general hospitals are prepared and trained to receive a large number of casualties without any warning. Triage occurs at the hospital entrance; persons not showing signs of poisoning will be observed for several hours in a special holding area and released (if their residential area is clean). Those who show signs of intoxication will be decontaminated immediately at the hospital entrance (in a mass decontamination center) and admitted for further treatment. 10 The decontamination centers usually are installed at the entrance to the emergency department (in a parking lot) or in any other convenient location. Hospital staff is trained and equipped to don personal protective equipment and immediately start the decontamination process.
Annual training and drills are held in all public hospitals, from tabletop exercises to full mass-casualty drills with simulated casualties.
The Exercise
After thorough planning and briefing of all organizations involved, a fully simulated drill was held in one of Israel's major national facilities. Umpires monitored the whole exercise. causing a MCI. 9 The model will serve as a framework for preparing specific operational procedures for each institution, that could be adapted to the local circumstances and threat(s).
Preparedness Planning
Any governmental or public institution must be prepared to prevent or respond to such attacks. Terrorists aim to disrupt the normal pattern of life and sow confusion and fear in a community or nation. Institutions symbolizing public order and governance are primary targets for terrorist attacks. The health system is an essential component of response to terrorism. It not only will provide medical support to the victims during and after the attack, but also, in most instances, will be the first organization to detect and identify agents used by the perpetrators.
Public health clinics, private practices, hospitals, emergency medical services (EMS), medical or forensic laboratories, public health services, and coroners will detect the signs, symptoms, and results caused by chemical, radiological, or biological weapons and report these findings to the security authorities. Public health and fire services, police, the military, and environmental and other emergency responders will investigate the event and contain the spreading of the hazardous or biological substance. Therefore, it is imperative that the health system be aware and prepared for any contingency that may affect the exposed population, and be able to initiate an immediate response.
Ongoing disease surveillance and awareness of any unusual pattern of signs and symptoms in the population may limit the spread of any disease and facilitate preventive or timely medical treatment.
Recently in Israel, awareness of any terrorist threat has prompted a nationwide effort to establish a generic medical doctrine for the prevention and responses to acts of terrorism. This doctrine has been adapted to the different threat scenarios and serves as a template for the response plan-the standard operational procedures (SOP) for each facility or organization.
In most countries, the police force would be the lead organization responding to a terrorist attack, establishing a joint command post at the site of the incident. This center will command, control, and coordinate all other rescue services, such as fire and EMS.
Response to Attack
Many governmental institutions and offices have a special security force to protect the facility, its staff, and visitors. Some of these institutions also have a dispensary, that provide emergency medical services for staff and visitors. The security teams will be the first responders to any emergency or MCI within the facility. They must develop contingency plans for terrorist attacks and for any type of weapon or agent. These plans must be co-coordinated with the police, fire brigade, and emergency medical system, including ambulance services and trauma centers. Joint planning teams should develop SOPs that define the tasks and responsibilities of each service. A vital component of any response is the preparedness of the population in the facility. Any comprehensive evacuation or rescue activity requires the full cooper-
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http://pdm.medicine.wisc.edu Prehospital and Disaster Medicine the building were prompted to leave the facility immediately, through the nearest exit. Those who were feeling unwell were advised to go to the main triage and treatment area located next to the main entrance. Within a short time, additional medical teams arrived from the nearest MDA station, and the medical command was transferred from the medical officer of the clinic to the chief paramedic of the EMS. All casualties were treated according to existing protocols; walking casualties received an atropine dose administered by an auto injector, whereas severe casualties received a dose of "atox" (atropine and toxogonine). The doses were adjusted to the age of the casualty. All casualties were evacuated by stretchers to the main triage and treatment area in a parking lot near one of the main entrances to the facility. The casualties were triaged, undressed, administered additional doses of antidote(s) according to their clinical status and evacuated by the ambulance services to several hospitals in the city.
All the floors and areas of the facility were screened for additional casualties. Those found were treated and evacuThe scenario involved a terrorist who covertly spread a toxic substance in the facility's cafeteria. Some 400 people (simulated by 400 schoolchildren) were present in the location during the attack. The effect of the toxic agent was immediate: approximately 100 casualties were down on the floor of the cafeteria and in adjacent corridors, and 300 managed to escape, most of the 300 presented with symptoms of various severity grades of organo-phosphate (OP) poisoning. The medical team of the facility was alerted immediately and was called to the site. Examination of the first victims made the clinical diagnosis of OP poisoning probable.
A general alarm was sounded, and the police, EMS, and Environmental Protection Agency's teams were alerted. The security personnel and the medical team of the facility donned their Level C PPE, 11 and the medics carried portable medical equipment, including antidotes. The teams proceeded to the cafeteria where most of the "casualties" were located. Although the building was vacated by all of its regular personnel before the drill, and the rest of the people in The lessons learned focused mainly on the organizational aspects of the medical preparedness and response in the facility. The issues, problem areas, and lessons drawn from the exercise are in Table 1 .
Discussion
Exercises must be performed periodically in all emergency services, organizations, and major private or public institutions. The main objectives of the exercise must be welldefined in advance, based on a comprehensive threat assessment. A monitoring and evaluation system should be part of any drill with an extensive self-evaluation and critique process at the end of the exercise.
A planning committee, including representatives of all participating agencies and bodies, must perform planning. During the planning process, perceived weaknesses and deficiencies of the responding agencies must be discussed frankly and clarified. One of the main obstacles in the multi-agency response to a major incident is a clear and accepted command and control structure and the full harmonic coordination between the agencies. It has to be clear who takes the lead at each stage of the event and what are the defined responsibilities of each participating body.
The location of the joint command post must be established well in advance and an integrated communication system established, facilitating unobstructed transfer of information and instructions to all participants. Incompatibility of communication systems has led to major disruption of disaster response activities, observed in New York City during the 9/11 event and problems arising between the Civil Defense and rescue services during the missile attacks on Israel during the 1991 Gulf War.
The probability that an unconventional attack on a public, private or governmental institution, or mass transit system frequented by a large number of people, has the potential of producing a severe mass-casualty incident is immense. Late detection of a toxic attack, executed by the dispersal of a persistent or volatile substance such as an organo-phosphate agent or anthrax spores, may be detected immediately or, in the latter event, after several days. The provision of antidotes or antibiotic treatment will be delayed until the first casualties are diagnosed. Biological agents usually have a longer incubation period and if a large number of people were exposed simultaneously, an epidemic could break out, before the threat can be contained. Therefore, it is imperative that automatic detectors be installed. Presently, such devices are undergoing development and trials. If such detectors were installed in the facility where the toxicological exercise occurred, an immediate response with the proper antidotes would have prevented many fatalities.
Air conditioning systems should not be switched off if the agent is volatile. They should, however, not recirculate air throughout the facility. It is important to ventilate the hot zone as soon as possible in order to diminish the concentration of the agent.
Another aspect of the response is how to utilize the medical team in the facility effectively before the arrival of reinforcement by the external EMS services. Should the small team of one physician, one paramedic, and several medics enter the hot zone where medical treatment is limited to the injection of antidotes, or rather, should they establish and operate in a first aid station? Such a station could be planned for outside the facility in a clean area where the team could triage and treat the casualties removed from the hot zone by security personnel with protective equipment. Security personnel, augmented by additional administrative and support staff, could be trained to provide the antidotes on-site using auto-injectors, before dispatching the casualties to the first-aid station. The EMS personnel who arrive later should join the team in the first aid station, assist in undressing the casualties, provide medical treatment, and set up an ambulance loading point.
Primary triage at the first aid station should classify the victims into three groups:
1. Those affected by the agent, who should receive immediate treatment and priority for evacuation; 2. The slightly affected (walking casualties), who can be evacuated later; 3. The acutely stressed, who can be managed on-site and if needed, evacuated later; and The dead, who should be placed in a separate area with their belongings, and will be identified later by the police.
All casualties should be undressed on-site and covered with sheets or blankets before transport to hospitals. If the agent is persistent, decontamination should be performed on-site. In any case, all casualties should be decontaminated at the entrance to the hospital. The hospital should install pre-constructed decontamination facilities that can be activated immediately. The Israeli model, developed before the Gulf War, consists of showers permanently fixed to the ceiling of an open-air parking garage or the side of a building. 12 
Conclusions
Many lessons have been learned from the chemical exercise. Preparedness planning and SOPs for MCIs should be required for all public institutions. The plan and response must be tailored to each building and institution, based on risk assessment and the use and layout of the facility. The plan must be integrated with all authorities and rescue services, including the health system. The primary response should be based on the human resources available in the facility. These teams will have to be reinforced by external police and rescue services. Health providers and response teams in the facility should be trained in providing first aid on-site, and should evacuate the casualties to a medical collection point established at the facility. Medical triage is crucial to establish treatment and evacuation priorities to the best-suited medical facility. All personnel caring for the injured must use proper PPE. Exercises must be conducted periodically in a realistic scenario setting, and debriefings should be held immediately after the exercise.
